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The Rupture of Yourg Muslim
Intelligentsia in the Modernization
of Indonesia
Abstraksi: Modemisasi Indonesia yang dilansir pemetintah orde Baru
telah membawa banyak perubahan yang sangat betarti. sejak tampil ke
puncak kekuasuun pa.da 1965, pemerintahan orde Baru di bawah Presiden
Soehafio memberlakukan kebijakan yang berotientasi pada pembangunan
(ekonomi), menggantikan orde Lama yang terlalu menekankan pemba-
ngunan ideologi dan politik. orde Baru mengetengahkan program-program
yang berorientasi pada persoalan-persoalan ptaktis yang secara langsrng
berhubungan dengan kebutuhan hidup masyarakat. Perbaikan ekonomi dan
peningkatan pendapatan masyarakat menjadi sasaran utama prcgram
ekonomi Orde Baru.
Proyek modemisasi oleh pemeintah orde Baru telah melahirkan pemikir-
an Islam yang sejalan dengan tuntutan perubahan sosial yang betlangsung
sejalan dengan pembangunan. Lahirnya pemikitan lslam ini ditandai teruta-
ma oleh upaya sejumlah intelektual muda Muslim pada 1970-an rntuk
menafsirkan kembali ajaran Islam yang dinilai tidak lagi memadai untuk
konteks perkenbangan Indonesia belakangan. Dalam hal ini, peran Nw-
cholish Madjid (watu itu sebagai ketua Himpunan Islam Indonesia tHMq)
sangat penting. Pada 1970-an, dia menggatisbawahi perlunya pembaharu-
an pemikiran dalam Islam, khususnya pada gagasan sekularisasi dan peno-
lakan untuk menjadikan Islam sebagai sebuah ideologi politik, lewat pet-
nyataannya yang terkenal, "Islam Yes, Pattai Islam No". Nurcholish dalam
hal ini berusaha memperkenalkan satu pemikitan Islam baru yang mene-
kankan substansi ajaran Islatn, atau nilai-nilai Islam untuk diartikulasikan
dalam konteks budaya Indonesia modem. Dengan demikian, petjuangan
umat Islam harus diletakkan pada ranah kultural, ketimbang pada gerakan
politik seperti dilakukan partai-partai Islam. Dan dengan perubahan pola
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gerakan Islam ini, Nwcholish Madjid jelas-jelas mendukung prcyek mo-
demisasi Orde Baru.
Namun tidak demimkian halnya dengan intelekltual Muslim lain yang
berorientasi dakwah (the dakwah-oriented Muslim intellectuals) . Mereka
justru menawarkan satu usaha "Islamisasi Indonesia" yang sudah jauh
masuk dalam orbit modern dan dengan demikian jauh dari ranah Islam.
Perbedaan tersebut bahkan makin kuat saat kelompok ini kemudian ber-
afiliasi dengan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII). Di bawah
wibawa pemikiran Islam tokoh kenamaan Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto
Mangkusasmita, M Rasjidi, dan Osman Raliby, gerakan dakwah ini se-
makin berkembang kuat khususnya di kampus-kampus umum. Maka,
sejumlah pusat kegiatan Islam di majid-masjid di kampus-kampus umum
berdiri dan membeikan training keislaman skripturalis, yang kemudiah mela-
hirkan gerakan tarbiyah di Indonesia.
Masjid Salman di Institut Teknologi Bandung QTB), Masjid Arif Rah-
man Hakin di Universitas Indonesia (UI), Masjid Al-Ghifari di Institut Per-
tanian Bogor (IPB) menjadi pusat-pusat kegiatan keislaman yang berorien-
tasi pada penciptaan kader Muslim yang berhaluan berbeda dari yang di-
tawarkan Nurcholish Madjid. Disuarakan tokoh terkemuka antara lain
Imaduddin Abdurrahim, Islamisasi menjadi satu gagasan pokok, yang
meliputi tidak pada saja aspek lahiriah-seperti cara berpakaian [semisal
berjilbab untukkaum perempluanl yang khas-tapi jugamenyentuh aspek
men das ar s ep e rti I i Imu p eng et ahuan. Int iny a, mer eka ne y akini p entin gny a
kembali ke Islam yang mumi sebagai landasan hidup di zaman modern,
ketimbang mengadopsi pola hidup dan cara berpikir Barat.
Dua corak pemikiran yang berbeda ini-masing-masing menawarkan
"Modemisasi Islam" dan "Islamisasi modemitas"-tampil demikian ma-
pan menghiasi wacana sosio-intelektual Islam Indonensia. Program Lem-
baga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), salah satu wujud gerakan dakwah di atas,
terus esksis dan bahkan berkembang khususnya di kampus-kampus umum
di Indonesia. Di era reformasi ini, keberadaan tnereka bahkan semakin
kuat dengan terbentuknya jaringan aktifis mereka melakui Kesatuan Aksis
Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (KMMI), dan secara politik terlembaga dalam
P artai Ke sej ahteraan S o si al (P KS ).
Sementaru itu, pada saat yang sama, gerakan pembaharun Islam yang
dilansir oleh Nurcholis Madjid juga terus menujukkan eksistensinya. Ber-
basis terutama di kampus Islam Institute Agama Islam Negeri (AIN) dan
Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN), aspirasi keislaman mereka tereflekikan
antara lain dalam laringan Islan Liberal yang menawarkan antara gagasan
[slam moderat di lndonesia.
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n March 1966, Arrny Chief of Staff Soeharto rose to power, taking
control of the Indonesian Government. Soeharto's 'New Order' re-
gime inherited a plethora of economic, political and social problems.
The New Order came to the conclusion that these crises had evolved as a
result of the previous regime's neglect of the economy and lack of con-
cern for social welfare. Economic recovery was viewed as a priority by
the new regime for it would tum the attention of the people from politics
to the economy thus changing the national outlook from 'politik-sebagai-
panglinta'(politics as commander) 
- 
as practiced during the Old Order 
-to' ekonomi-sebagai-panglima' (economy as commander).
In emphasizing the importance of economic growth and modernrza-
tion, the new regime made every effort to restore links with the capitalist
world and multinational organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, from which Indonesia had withdrawn in Au-
gust 1965 as part of Sukarno's anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism cam-
paign. Economic development required capital, but as the country was
bankrupt, the New Order had no choice but to open itself to the idea of
foreign investment and loans from outside sources. To guarantee the in-
flow of foreign capital and the success of economic development, political
stability was considered essential.
This provided the new regime with the justification to dismantle what it
perceived as political barriers to modernization. Under the slogan 'pem-
bangunan' (development),' developmentalism' was inaugurated as the new
official orthodoxy. This was officially signaled by the unveiling of Soehar-
to's first cabinet as president (June 1968-March1973),t which was named
'Kabinet Pembangunan 1'(the First Development Cabinet). Alongside tiris
state technocratic ideology, political stability was made the primary polit-
ical objective reinforced by a doctrine entitled the 'Military's Dual Func-
tion', which legitimized the military's role in non-military affairs. With this
pair of 'magic' formulae, that is 'pembangunan' and'political stability',
the New Order soon transformed itself into what Feith called a 'reDres-
sive-developmentalist' regime.2
With a combination of effective economic management, a supportive
environment, and political stability, Indonesian economic development soon
became a fairytale story of success. By the late 1960s price stability had
been achieved, and the Indonesian economy began to experience unprec-
edented rapid growth, which was sustained for the next three decades.
Throughout the period 1965-1996 the Indonesian Gross National Product
(GNP) grew steadily at an average annual rate of 6.7yo.3 The econornic
growth that Indonesia experienced during this period transformed the coun-
try from being a so-called economic 'basket-case', which was poorer
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than most other Southeast Asian countries, into one of the'Newly Indus-
trializedEconomies' Q.{IE) of Asia.In1993 the World Bank, in its famous
but controversial report on the 'East Asian Miracle', classified Indonesia
as one of the 'highest performing Asian economies'.4
Alongside economic developrnent, Indonesia's social Structure under-
went a dramatic change. A successful family planning program reduced
population growth from an average of 2.4%o in the period 1965-1980 to an
average of 1.8% in 1980-1996.5 The poverty rate decreased considerably
from700h at the end of the 1960s to27Yo in the middle of the 1990s. The
proportion of Indonesia's population living in urban areas rose from 170%
inlgTl to3lvoin 1990. The share of professional, managerial and clerical
occupations rose from 5.7%o in 1971 to 8.8% in 1990.6 Beginning in the
1980s, sustained economic growth had given rise to the unprecedented
accumulation of private capital. Vast private commercial .conglomerates
emerged, many owned by Sino-Indonesians and a few by client indige-
nous bourgeoisie, all possessing high-level political connections'7
All these tremendous socio-economic achievements had their costs.
The greatest cost was the sacrifice of political freedom. With the econo-
my being in command, the role of politics was reduced to simply main-
taining national stability. consequently, the Indonesian honeymoon with
freedom in the New Order's public sphere did not last long. The regime
used various repressive measures to curb freedom of speech and associ-
ation as well as political opposition and intellectual criticism, as all ofthese
were perceived as serious threats to political stability.
Besides the demolition of the New Order's greatest enemy, the Indone-
sian communist Party (PKI), one of the first victims of this repressive
regime was political Islam as it was marginalized from the formal political
arena. The 'extreme right', so to speak, became the scapegoat for past
political disorder.
Although Islamic groups provided critical support to the army in dis-
mantling the old order, the New order's actions and policies over the
ensuing two decades prevented Islamic involvement in any state affairs.
Once it had consolidated its power, the new regime set about systemati-
cally neutralizing Islam as a basis for political and legal mobilization whilst
furlher increasing bureaucratic leverage over Islam.8
Amidst the state's push for rnodernization, young Muslim intelli-
gentsia were divided into two camps, that is, the proponents of the 'mod-
ernization of Islam' and those who supporled the 'Islamization of moder-
nity'.
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At the Intellectual Crossroads
The first serious Islarnic intellectual response to the challenges pre-
sented by the New Order's modernization push came from fourth gener-
ation Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia. This generation of Muslim intellec-
tuals was composed mainly of those who were born in the 1930s and
1940s and who were the first product of the postcolonial education sys-
tem, in which Muslims began to gain equal access to modern schools.
During its formative phase, this generation experienced an intense ex-
posure to ideological (Islamic) radicalization,characterized by political dis-
putes on the national scene that ignited conflicts and tensions within stu-
dent politics during the guided democracy period ofthe Fifties and Sixties.
This generation also experienced an intense exposure to the drive for a
national language and greater national solidarity, which was spurred by the
urgency to build a corlrnon bloc to counter pro-establishment political and
intellectual forces and to dismantle the Sukarno regime. Unlike previous
generations, however, this generation was much more confident, both
psychologically and intellectually, which was greatly influenced by the
dominant position that Islamic student organizations had taken in student
politics during the 1960s.
Intellectuals of this generation largely came from Himpunan Mahasiswa
Islam (the Islamic University Students' Association, est. 1947), or HMI. As
a synthesis of the internal tensions between Islamic-mindedness on the one
hand and nationalistic solidarity on the other hand, HMI as an entity under-
went a degree of political moderation. HMI as anorganization continued to
maintain this balance between its Islamic and nationalistic orientations, al-
though individual intellectuals of HMI began to divide by and large into two
streams: those who were more inclined towards political Islam versus those
who more inclined to a more inclusive political ideology.
The chairman of HMI during this crucial period of the early years of the
New Order was a gifted young intellectual, Nurcholish Madjid.' Witli his
intellectual capacity and multiple religio-educational affiliations, he was the
right man at the right time. His all-encompassing and non-sectarian outlook
enabled him to be a bridge-builder in the internal fragmentation within HMI.
He was a leader and solidarity rnaker. His invigorating Islamic ideas provided
a common ground for his fellow HMI intellectuals of different ideological
inclinations. The combination of his intellectual qualities and leadership style
saw him elected as the chairman of HMI for two consecutive tenns (1966-
68, 1968-71), which had no precedent in the HMI tradition.
During the period of Madjid's leadership, HMI activists experienced a
kind of identity crisis. HMI had sided with Masjumil0during the Old Order
period, and thus the sidelining of political Islarn at the beginning of the
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New Order was of a great disappointment. On the other hand, the domi-
nance of HMI in student politics from the early 1960s had given rise to
expectations of a significant public role in the future of the nation. HMI
was in limbo, forced to choose between a return to the unfinished project
of 'Islamizing' Indonesian politics or embracing the project of liberalizing
Islamic thinking and politics.
Faced with these choices, discourse emerged on some crucial issues
concerning tire future shape of Islam and HMI's historicity. Externally,
there was a demand to produce strategic and rigorous responses to the
challenges presented by modernization and the peripheralization of politi-
cal Islarn. At the same time, a response was required to the dilemma of
whether to support the so-called 'integtasi ulnmat'(integration of the
ummat) or to side with the agenda of liberalizing Islamic thinking that
came to be known as the 'renewal movement' (getakan pembaharuan).
Internally, HMI had to choose whether it should be politically independent
or side with Islamic socio-political organizations and also wl-rether it had to
be a cadre or mass-based organization.
Early general reaction of the HMI intellectuals to modernization was
defensive for it was perceived as a pre-text to westernization that was too
many within the HMI circles synonymous with secularism. In essence,
there emerged three kinds of responses: liberal, reactionary (slamist), and
moderate (moderate-reactionary).
The initial liberal response came from a circle of HMI activists frorn
the Yogyakada branch, sometimes referred to as the Yogya Group; the
branch that had supporled Sukarno's orthodoxy, Manipol-USDEK, during
the guided democracy period. There were a number of prorninent intellec-
tuals from this group, including Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and Dawam
Rahardjo with Djohan and Wahib being far-liberals and Dawam being a
moderate (centre)-1iberal.
Outside HMI, another group that influenced the intellectual develop-
ment of these young intellectuals was the 'Limited Group'. This study
group operated from 1967 up to 197 1 under the mentorship of Mukti Ali,
a Western trained Islamic educator (a lecturer at IAIN Yogyakarla)rr who
introduced them to his ideas on comparative religion and to modern Islam-
ic thinking. In Ahmad Wahib's case, he had a strong emotional and intel-
lectual connection to some Catholic priests for he had spent some years at
a Catholic student's dormitory. For this group, modernization was both
welcomed and perceived as being critical to lndonesian Muslims' future
development, even if it might lead to westernization.r2
The reactionary-Islamist response came notably from activists of the
HMI Dakwah Body, Lernbaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam (LDMI). Estab-
Studia Islanika, Vol. 12, No. 3,2005
The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia 38r
lished in 1966, the first chairman of this body was Imaduddin Abdulrahirn
assisted by Endang SaifuddinAnshari (both ofthe HMI's Bandung Branch),
and Miftah Faridl (of the Solo branch). As its central leadership was located
in Bandung, a group of intellectuals associated with this body was often
refemed to as the Bandung Group. During the guided democracy period,
HMI's Bandung branch was a strong opponent of Manipol-USDEK. The
general attitude of this group to the modemizationproject tended to be reac-
tionary and suspicious, for reasons oflogic and politics. This group did not
object to modern rationalism, science and technology, because the Islamic
doctrine and scientific discovery, according to the standard apologetic ar-
gument of the Islamist, are not really conflicting but complementary forms
of belief. Nevertheless, this group objected to the tenn 'modemization' since
it was perceived as closely associated with the process of westernization
and secularization, and its adoption by the New Order regime was suspect-
ed to be a pretext for marginalizing Islarnic political influence.
That the views of this group echoed those of Masjumi leaders was not
very surprising. Leaders of LDMI, especially Imaduddin and Endang,
maintained an emotional and intellectual connection with Masjumi leaders
and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah lndonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council of
Islamic Outreach).13 Fathers of these two men (Abdulrahim and Muham-
mad Isa Anshari) originated from Langkat (East Sumatra) and West
Sumatra respectively. An Al-Azhar graduate, Abdulrahim was a well-known
local Masjumi leader in Sumatra, while Isa Anshari, after moving to Band-
ung, was prominent as a militant Masjumi and Persis (Islarnic puritan-
reformist association) leader. Moreover, both Imaduddin and Endang had
been exposed to the sarne religious teacher, Rusjad Nurdin (a Persis and
Masjumi leader). As the son of a Persis leader, Endang had a long associ-
ation with Nurdin, while Lnaduddin was in close contact with him after
Nurdin became a lecturer in Islamic studies at the Bandung Institute of
Technology (ITB) in 1962.14 Thus, ethnically, ideologically, and intellectu-
ally, both Imaduddin and Endang had a predisposition to identify them-
selves with Mohammad Natsir.r5 Moreover, both also belonged to a group
of young intellectuals who had been trained by the DDII from the late
1960s to become Islamic propagandists for the Muslim cornmunity in
secular universities.
The moderate group, which tended to reinforce the reactionary views
and as such is appropriately referred to as moderate-reactionary (moder-
ate-Islamist), accepted modernization with qualification. This view repre-
sented the general attitude of HMI's central leadership (Pengurus Besar,
PB) in Iakarta. As a group with a wide range of ideological inclinations,
the central leadership was caught in the rniddle of a tug-of-war between
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the Jakarta-Bandung axis versus the Jakarta-Yogyakarta axis, with the
former being what Madjid called the 'political lane' Qalut politik) andthe I
latterbeingthe'lane of ideas' (alutide).Madjidhimself originallytookthe I
moderate-reactionarY Position.
In 1968, Madjid wrote a series of articles entitled 'Modemisasi ialah
Rasionalisasi Bukan Westemisasi' (Modemization is Rationalization, not
westernization), published by Pandji Masyarakaf6 and Liga Demokrasi.
According to him, a simplified definition of modemization is 'that which is
identical, or almost identical, with rationalization'and if the term is defined
in this way, modernization for a Muslim is imperative. Nevefiheless, he then
warned that there was a possibility of secularism (including humanism, lib-
eralism and communism) and Westemization being disguised under the cloak
of ,modernization'. In his view, secularism should be resisted for it could
destroy the religious basis of the indonesian state. At the same time, he
emphasized the necessity of ideology and the indispensability of religion as
conditions for a purposeful national existence. Modemization in the Indone-
sian context, he added, should not entail the end ofideology, because life is
not possible without a set of beliefs, ideas, attitudes and convictions. He
finally warned that there was a hidden agenda developed by some of the
Indonesian westernized elite who developed a strong dislike for anything
Islamic. They therefore directed modernization toward Westernization in
accord with the spirit of what he called 'snouckism'r7 to marginalize Islam-
ic political aspirations. He then came up with a proposition:
Whoever is courageous enough to be honest with himself will admit that the
present difficulties are due to the fact that minority groups which do not enjoy the
popular support of the people are playing too big a role, while the majority group
is being obstructed from playing its decisive role. The role it is playing does not
correspond to itS majority position.18
Given that the arlicle exhibited Madjid's advocacy for Islamic political
aspirations, soon afterwards he was celebrated as 'Natsir Muda' (the Young
Natsir).re
When the New Order refused to allow the revival of Masjumi, the HMI
intellectuals were at the outset overwhelmed by a general sense of frustration.
The liberal goup then came to the conclusion that HMI and Muslims in general
were not comrnitted to Islamic organizations or leaders but rather to islamic
values. In tl-reir view, Islarn itself was not supposed to be treated as an ideolory
but rather as a source ofuniversal moral and ethical precepts. For this group, the
fonnal demand for an Islarnic parly or Islamic state was not only unnecessary
but also rnisleading. With this kind ofthinking, the group moved fur{rer towards
explicitly supporting Pancasilaas the principle of the state.
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On the other hand, the reactionary group continued to be preoccupied
with a standard apologetic argument that Islam is not only a religion but
also a complete way of life and that in Islam there is no separation between
religious and political life. Despite the New Order's repression of political
Islam, intellectuals of this kind managed to find other ways to socialize
their Islamic political aspirations.
The moderate group attempted to avoid apologetic arguments through
its willingness to criticize standard Islamic arguments as well as the short-
coming of the Muslim community, but it continued to perceive Islam as an
ideo-political systern. Madjid, for instance, in the first term of his chair-
manship had criticized HMI's use of Tjokroaminoto's book, Islam and
Socialism in cadre trainings, for its apologetic tendency. At the same time,
he wrote a famous handbook for HMI training purposes entitled Islamisme
(Islamism), which presented Islam as an alternative ideology to commu-
nism, capitalisrn and other secular ideologies.20
Concerning the integration of the ummat, HMI intellectuals initially
viewed this as a critical issue. The eighth National HMI Congress in Solo
(10-17 September 1966) supported the idea of an All Islam Congress. The
liberal group then came to favor the agenda of the Islamic renewal move-
ment, even though prioritizing this agenda could cause a strained relation-
ship with the ummat. For this group, the main problem for Indonesian
Muslims was not the fracturing of the Islamic community, but rather the
obstinacy of Islamic thinking. For the Islamist group, however, Islamic
disputes were regarded as at the root of Muslims' weakness, and the
preservation of Islamic solidarity was considered as far more important
than the self-indulgence of intellectual adventure. For the moderates, the
reconstruction of Islarnic thinking was important, but not at the risk of
severing the relationship with the ummat and other Islamic organizations.
Despite severe external (political) pressures imposed by the new re-
gime, there was a positive internal development that helped boost HMI's
intellectual confidence and expectations. The preponderance ofyoung Is-
lamic intelligentsia during the Old Order became even stronger after the
changeover to the New Order polity. In the wake of the dismantling of
leftist movements, there was an upsurge in student interest to learn about
Islam and to join Islamic student organizations. At the same time, religious
instruction in secular schools and universities was made compulsory.
Consequently, in the secular strongholds such as ITB, for instance, where
students who practiced the weekly Friday communal prayer (shalat jum'at)
were previously referred to as 'Arabic Camels', were now dens for stu-
dents who had began to turn to Islam.2r
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The growing interest in Islamic studies, practices and organizations
(hereafter, referred to as the'Islamic turn') received a different reaction
from HMI intellectuals. For the liberal group, the phenomena of the 'Is-
lamic turn, provided a means to end obsessions with formal and quantita-
tive Islamic achievements. HMI, according to this view, should become
an independent organization and detach itself from Islamic organizations.
Moreover, as this group believed that the urgent need was for the renewal
of Islamic thinking, it was argued that HMI should position itself as the
nurturer of a creative minority rather then as a mass organization. In con-
trary, the dakwah-oriented Islamist intellectuals viewed the growing inter-
est in Islam as a fine opporlunity to bring educated people to the 'house'
of Islam. For this group, HMI should increase its dakwah efforts to reach
a wider audience. In its eyes, to bring new convefts into Islamic action
groups was of paramount importance in order to strengthen their Islamic
socio-political consciousness. To better respond to this challenge, HMI
should maintain its network with other Islamic organizations.22 The mod-
erate members agreed with the idea that HMI should position itself as an
independent organization, but by no means detach itself from other Islam-
ic organizations and terminate its dakwah efforts'23
The internal disputes among HMI intellectuals reached a climax in the
wake of the deepening affinity of the dakwah-oriented intellectuals with
DDII and the changing face of Madjid's intellectual orientation. This de-
velopment began on the eve of the second term of Madjid's chairmanship.
This affinity was especially strengthened by a common concern with the
challenges of the dakwah movement. In the face of the 'Islamic turn"
there had already emerged in the late 1960s embryos of the mosque move-
ment in the setting of secular universities. At the same time, when reli-
gious instruction became compulsory, there was a surge in demand from
secular universities for lecturers in religious instruction. In 1968 Imadud-
din, for instance, was asked by ITB to be a lecturer in Islamic studies,
though his academic background was electrical engineering. In response
to such circumstances, in late 1961 the DDII began to promote the estab-
lishment of campus mosques in Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Medan
and Makassar. it provided not only motivation but also financial assis-
tance. About the same time, it also began to recruit dakwah-oriented intel-
lectuals from diverse secular university backgrounds (mostly former ac-
tivists of HMI and Pelajar Islam Indonesia, or PII) to be trained as lectur-
ers for religious instruction and as mentors for the mosque movement.2a
The cadre training of the dakwahmovement was largely conducted in
Jakarla with headquarters being in the ashram of Panitia Haji Indonesia
(PHI, Indonesian Haji committee) in Kwitang (central Jakarta). The prin-
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cipal trainers were DDII intellectuals, such as Mohammad Natsir, Prawo-
to Mangkusasmita M Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby. Besides an in-depth study
of various aspects of Islam and Islamic teaching, this dakwah group -
sometimes referred to as the PHI group 
- 
made an atternpt to standardize
the content ofreligious instruction in universities under the banner 'Islam
as a Scientific Discipline' (Islam Disiplin IImu,IDI). This effort gained
official support from the Ministry of Religious Affairs during Alamsjah
Prawiranegara's period (1978-1983), but was then ignored by his succes-
sor, Munawir Sjadzali, who disliked the formalization of Islam.25 The IDI
was in fact a prelude to the ambitious project of the Islamization of the
sciences that would became an imporlant Islamic theme in the following
years. The network of dakwah-oriented young intellectuals with the DDII
group provided the channel for the transmission of Islamic historical ideas
and the impetus for the mosque movement that became more apparent
from the early 1970s onwards.
Until the late 1960s, the dakwah-oriented intellectuals also benefited
fromtr4adjid's tendency as the chairman of HMI to be sympathetic to the
Islamists' ideas. Madjid had previously shared sirnilar views with the Band-
ung group, in their opposition to the pro-Manipol and pro-liberal ideas of
the Yogyakarta group. He had been admired by the dakwahgroup so much
that hnaduddin named his son Nurcholish. Later, however, Madjid disas-
sociated himself from the Islamist (dakwah) group.
Madjid's shift towards liberal Islamic thinking was partly a result of his
intellectual dynamism and surroundings. As Wahib stated, 'Nurcholish
Madjid is a man of learning and reading. The book is his most beloved
friend. Even if he feels that he is right, his willingness to continuously
learn will in turn force him to re-question that which he has previously
believed.'26 Because ofhis reading hobby, Wahib, added, 'Madjid has enough
scientific tools so that with a mental switch he can leapfrog to catch up
with what other people have initiated' (p.163). Madjid was also an inde-
pendent individual with no special older mentor.27 For an IAIN student,
becoming the chairman of HMI was very unusual and is also a reflection
of his personal strength. Madjid also exhibited a strong tendency to be
relatively less radical than other students of the IAINs (State Islamic Insti-
tutions) and tradition alist pesantrens (traditional Islamic boarding schools)
and to strongly desired Western scientific knowledge and the language of
modem' intellectual discourse'.
The impetus for his shift to the liberal cause, however, was his direct
encounter with the Western world. In October 1968. he was invited to
visit the USA by the State Department of the Federal Government of the
United States of America under the sponsorship of the Council for Lead-
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ers and Specialists (CLS). The reason behind this invitation, according to
an official of the American Embassy in Jakarta, was 'just to show him
what he dislikes so far.'28 During his two-month stay in America, he visit-
ed universities and learned about the academic life of university students,
attended seminars and discussions with several academic and political fig-
ures. and witnessed some of the achievements of Western civilization. He
also had the opportunity to meet the influential Indonesian socialist intel-
lectual Sudjatrnoko, then the Indonesian ambassador to the USA, who
welcomed his visit with great hospitality. Shortly afterwards, he contin-
ued his journey to France, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan. Next in March 1969, atthe invitation
of King Faisal of the Saudi Arabia, he made a pilgrimage to Mecca along
with some 10 other HMI functionaries. Reflecting on his visit both to the
Western and Islamic worlds, he came to realize the disjuncture between
Islamic ideals and the reality of life in the Muslim world. on the other
hand, tl-re west that he had been so critical of, exhibited rnany positive
dimensions and achievements. Henceforth; 'he began to appreciate the
good aspects of Western humanism'2e.
Madjid's mental switch had begun, though this did not lead to a sudden
radical shift in ideology. For sometime, his new insight was submerged
under a thick sediment of his established intellectual thinking as recorded
in his work Islamisme. His thinking as described in Islamisme, combined
with his new insights and other HMI intellectuals' ideas, were synthesized
during and in the aftermath of the ninth HMI National Congress in Malang
(3-10 May 1969).It was here that a new HMI ideology' known as Nilai-
Nilai Dasar Perjuangan (NDP, the Basic Principles of the Struggle) be-
came known.3o Among other things, this ideology emphasized Islamic
monotheism (tauhSd) as the guiding theme of the Islamic struggle. For
HMI in pafticular, it emphasized the need to maintain integration and co-
herence between iman (belief), ilmu (knowledge) and amal (action) as
well as between an Islamic and nationalistic orientation.3t
The remaining months of 1969 were critical ones for Madjid's thinking
about Islamic liberalism. He continued to be overwhelmed by a process of
self reflection, whether to side with the integration effort or the renewal
movement. An influential factor in his move towards the renewal move-
ment came from informal small group discussions which involved his
closest friends, especially Utomo Dananjaya. He was a moderate leader of
pII (chairman of PII, 196'7-1969) and an intimate friend of Madjid who in
1969 reactivated the tradition of inviting the HMI chairman (at that time
Madjid) to give a speech to the PII National congress (held that year in
Bandung). In the same year, at a post-.Idul Fitri social event (known as
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halal bihalal), Utomo conducted a discussion under the theme 'Integration
of the Islamic Community', which involved Subchan Z.E (of Nahdlatul
Ulama), H.M. Rasjidi (ofMuhammadiyah), Anwar ljokroaminoto (of PSII),
and Rusli Khalil (of Perli). However it became evident following the event
that the agenda of integration had not been well received. So Dananjaya
began to conduct small group discussions, which involved his close fel-
lows: Nurcholish Madjid (of HMI), Usep Fathuddin (of PII), and Anwar
Shaleh (of GPII), to solve the dilemma of whether to supporl.the imprac-
tical aims of integration or to side with the disintegrating renewal move-
ment.
In addition to the small group discussions, Madjid also conducted dis-
cussions with.Masjumj leaders such as Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Moham-
ad Roem, and Osman Raliby from which he got the impression that these
men did not really consider the idea of an Islamic state as an urgent prior-
ity. In his view, 'They had an idea about something like an Islamic state,
but it had yet to be achieved through democratic mechanisms. Even a man
like Roem had no aspirations about it, though he retained his empathy for
its supporters.'32
Although these small group discussions did not produce any conclusive
results, they provided new inspiration for the participants. Already in late
November 1969, Madjid wrote personal letters to Ahmad Wahib and Djohan
Effendi, two liberal protagonists who had resigned from HMI on 30 Sep'-
tember and 10 October 1969 respectively because of their disagreement
with the Islamist group in HMI. In his letter he stated his agreement with the
principal ideas of these two men, while asking their understanding about the
difficulty of implementing such ideas in HML33 Then, in preparing a post-
Idul Fitri social event in 19'10, which was organized jointly by four Muslim
student'youth and sardjana (academic) organizations 
- 
HMI, GPI, PII, and
Persami 
- 
the committee, which involved those participants in the small
discussions, agreed to choose 'rethinking and integration' as the theme of
the haLal bihalal discussion. The original intention of choosing this theme
was simply to stimulate discussion and to underscore the determination of
the leadership of the Muslim youth groups to find solutions to the deeply
agonizing problems of the ummat.Initially, the intellectual invited to give the
speech on this occasion was Alfian (a Muslim intellectual from the Indone-
sian Institute of Sciences, LIPI). But he was unable to come, so Harun
Nasution (a rationalist Islamic scholar) was chosen to be his replacement.
However Nasution was aiso unavailable. Finally, Madjid was appointed to be
the speaker and 'the rest is history'.34
In this halal bihalal event, held on 3 January 1970, Madjid presented a
paper entitled 'Keharusan Pembaharuan Pernikiran Islam dan Masalah In-
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tegrasi ummat, (The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the
Problem of Integratin gthe (Jmmaf). In the speech he explained that in his
view the agenda of integration was an impractical approach. The political
opportunity structure of the New Order necessitated changes in the be-
havioral and emotional condition of the Muslim community, whereas the
idealistic approach of integration would only help to perpetuate intellectual
impotence and stagnation within the ummat. He believed that the Muslims'
loss ofwhat he referred to as'psychological striking force' had caused a
, 25-y earset-back' for the ummat and was too complex to be solved through
an integration-oriented approach. Thus, he considered the agenda for re-
newing Islamic thought to be a cure for the frailty of the ummaf. Contro-
versial issues of this agenda might undermine integrative efforts, but in his
judgment the risk was worth taking; even if this project failed to produce
the desired results it would still be useful at least as an attempt to cast aside
the burden of intellectual stagnation. This project, he added, became more
urgent in view of the fact that established reforrnist Islamic organizations
such as Muharnmadiyah, Al-Irsyad, Persis and others had lost their re-
formist verve and elan vitalthatcaused them to be indistinguishable from,
and even less progressive than, the traditionalist Muslim organizations.
As he went on to outline his thinking on 'the renewal movement"
Madjid came to a very crucial point. He believed that the renewal process
should begin by liberating the utnmatfrom'traditional values' in favor of
.future-oriented' values. This liberation process, he continued, necessitat-
ed the adoption of 'secularization' , the promotion of intellectual freedom,
the pursuit of the 'idea of progress' and the cultivation of open attitudes.
What he meant by the term 'seculatizalion' here is not identical with sec-
ularism, as the latter, in his view, is admittedly alien to the Islamic world-
view. Madjid borrowed the interpretation of a christian theologian, Haley
cox, and of an American sociologist, Roberl N. Bellah, so that by secular-
izalion he meant a process of 'temporalizing' values which are indeed
temporal, but which the ummathad a tendency to regard as otherworldly
(ukfuawi). The term also meant to him the 'desacralization' of everything
other than that which is truly transcendental. Last but not least, in re-
sponse to an encouraging growth of people's interest in Islam on the one
hand and the impotence of political Islam on the other hand, he came to
the conclusion that a good proportion of the Muslim community at that
time was in favor of: 'Islam: yes; Islamic party: no!'
Madjid,s courage in taking the unpopular step of favoring the renewal
movement despite running the risk of attracting popular criticism was a
decisive moment for his initiation as an avant-garde intellectual. As Max
weber noted, .lntellectuals often face the dilemma of having to choose
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between intellectual integrity and extra-intellectual contingencies, between
rationalizing the flow of ideas and dogmatic stagnation. Any decision in
favor of the latter involves a 'sacrifice of inteliect' .'3s A typical ambiva-
lence arises from this position, described by Bernhard Giesen as follows:
Intellectuals bewail the lack of understanding from a public that is unaware,
insufficiently aware, or even hostile to their interpretations. on the other hand,
precisely this rejection by the public typically creates the tension that can be
understood as the interpretative head start ofthe intellectual avant-garde. In his or
her complaint about the public, the intellectual initially constructs the basic struc-
ture within which he or she can gain exceptionally as an intellectual. conversely,
the adoption ofintellectual interpretations by a wider public always poses a danger
to the distinction ofan intellectual.
By prioritizing ideas over public opinion, Madjid tended to be indiffer-
ent towards the social implications of his contemplative questionings and
statements. This is especially true in his crucial statement about the neces-
sity of 'Secularization'. No ffiatter what his definition of Secularization
was, language or terminology does not operate in isolation and cannot
escape from history. Meaning is always constructed in social and histori-
cal contexts where social institutions and struggles engage in the process.
As Jay L. Lemke argued, 'All meanings are made within the communities
and the analysis of meaning should not be separated from the social, his-
torical, cultural and political dirnensions of these communities.'37 In the
cognitive structure of the Indonesian Muslim community, the term ,secu-
lar' and its derivations had an established negative connotation as signifi-
ers of otherness. The term was commonly associated with the removal of
religious influence frorn the public and political sphere 
- 
which is consid-
ered as alien to an Islamic worldview 
- 
with a specific reference to a
repressive Dutch colonial policy under Snouck Hurgronje's influence to
marginalize political Islam. Muslims' objections to the term were exacer-
bated by Madjid's excessive reference to Western academic sources, which
reinforced the sense of otherness of the term.
For similar reasons, Madjid's statement about 'Islam: yes; Islamic par-
ty: no!' had also been misunderstood. Like ljokroaminoto,s statement
before the Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union)38 congress in Surakarta in
1913 that'SI is not a political party, and not an organization that desires a
revolution, and it is loyal to the government,' Madjid's statement is actual-
ly not void ofpolitical intention. It can be considered as a political strategy
in the guise of a non-formal political approach; that in the powerlessness
of political Islam, Muslims should seek other ways to survive. But again
because it was perceived as part and parcel of his statement on Secular-
ization, his critics could not read the nuances of his statement.
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The clash between 'vision' and 'tradition' occurred around these two
crucial points in Madjid's position and exhausted intellectual debates there-
after. The debate was trapped in a semantic contention, which failed to
deal with substantial issues. The scale ofcontroversy and the seriousness
of Madjid's vision became even more widespread and forceful because of
the intensity and density of media coverage, especially by the magazines
Tempo and Pandji Masjarakat which became the main instigators of the
polemic. Spurred by the media coverage, the reactionary elements of the
Muslim community both from the older and younger generations of Mus-
lim intellectuals, such as H. M. Rasjidi (a Masjumi/DDII leader), Abdul
Qadir Jaelani (a rnilitant PII leader), and Endang Saifuddin Anshari (a dak-
wah-oriented intellectual of the HMI) beganto launch severe attacks. Among
others, Rasjidi criticized Madjid's view of secularization as being an arbi-
trary interpretation, for it already had a standard signification. Rasjidi fur-
ther argued that Madjid ignored the fact that the secularization process
would in turn lead to secularism. In supporting Rasjidi's critique, other
polemicists objected to what they perceived as Madjid's rejection of Is-
lamic politics. They believed in 'Islam, yes; Islarnic par[r, yes!' 3e
The arguments and categorization made by the media and analysts of-
ten force academics to hold to a particular intellectual position more firmly
even when they previously had some doubts. Although the original inten-
tion of Madjid's speech was only to stimulate discussion, the effect of
hostile criticism and rnedia exposure pressed him to move further along
the path of the liberal cause. His move in this direction was welcomed by
the liberal camp. Ahmad Wahid expressed this as follows:
As we [Wahib and Effendi] got Nurcholish Madjid's paper from Dawam, via
the post, we expressed our happiness by going around Yogyakarta to meet with
leaders of HMI and the ummatfto tell them about his speechl. To be frank, we
exploited Madjid's authority as the chairman of the biggest and the most respected
student organization, who was often called 'the second Natsir', to popularize the
liberal thinking.ao
On the other hand, Madjid's departure from his original position great-
ly disappointed the dakwah-oriented group. This disappointment provided
the group with the impetus to engage more seriously in the mosque move-
ment.
The Development of the Dakwah Movement
To analyze the development of the dakwahmovement 
- 
as well as the
renewal movement 
- 
theories on social movements provide useful in-
sights. There are two major paradigms in contemporary debates about
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social movements. The first is the so-called 'resource mobilization' ap-
proach, and the second is the 'personal motivation' approach. The first
approach takes as its starting point the analysis of otganizations rather
than the individual. The prirne research question of this approach is not
who the actors are or what motivates them but rather why some move-
ments are more successful than others. The resource mobilization ap-
proach studies the mechanisms through which movements recruit their
members and the organizational forms through which mobilization of both
human and social resources takes place. The second approach focuses on
the personal motivations that lead one to participate in social movements.
This approach investigates individuals' socio-psychological backgrounds
that ultimately lead them to become involved in a parlicular movement.ar
Based on these approaches, this analysis of the dakwalr movement will
use a productive exchange between the two perspectives, ratirer than an
either/or choice.
Tlre driving force for tl-re early development of the dakwah movement
was the socio-political dislocation of Islamist intellectuals. They had to
face threats from two directions: state political repression and the chal-
lenge of the liberal-rninded Muslims. Driven by Islamic political aspira-
tions on the one hand, but confronted by the government's obstruction of
political Islam on the other, this Islamist group experienced acute political
dislocation. In the meantime, the general mass media, as another manifes-
tation ofthe public sphere, tended to serve as the state ideological appara-
tus in charnpioning modernization. The media was thus preconditioned to
be sympathetic to the renewal movement. Realizing that the public sphere
was hostile to their ideo-political aspirations, the Islamist intellectuals cre-
ated a subtle and fluid social movement, which was relatively impervious
to state control, as a new foundation for constructing collective solidarity
and identity.
The alternative resource for the mobilization of the new Islamists' col-
lective action was found in the relatively 'free' space of independent'
mosques located on university campuses.a2 Although the function of the
mosque as the central ground of religio-political movements was not some-
thing new to the Muslim World, its use as the base camp of a religio-
political movement in a secular university was certainiy a new phenome-
non in Indonesia. Most of the secular university mosques began to emerge
during the New Order period.a3 Perhaps some of the more prominent ex-
amples of such a phenomenon included the establishment of campus
mosques within the prestigious universities ITB and the University of In-
donesia (UI).
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The establishment of the ITB mosque, known as Salman Mosque, had
been planned by a nucleus of Islamic activists of this institution since
1958. However a number of obstacles 
- 
including the unfavorable re-
sponse of the rectorate to the idea of establishing a mosque inside 'the
bastion of the secular inteilectuals' 
- 
delayed its building and so it was
only cornpleted in l9l2.aa The UI mosque began to be built in 1966 and
was finished in 1968.Itwas namedArief RahmanHakimMosque inmemory
of an Islamic activist of that university who became a martyr of the stu-
dent movement of 1966. Most other campus mosques began to emerge
from the latter paft of the 1970s onwards.
In the absence of mosques, Islamic activists began their religious ac-
tivities in public spaces such as classrooms or auditoriums. With the fre-
quent difficulty of getting official permission to establish a mosque inside
the campus, many 'clever' strategies had to be developed. The establish-
ment of the mosque at the Bogor Institute ofAgriculture (IPB), Al-Ghifari,
in the early 1980s, for instance, is an interesting case. It was originally
proposed to the authorities as a laboratory building. Once it had been built,
however, Islamic activists shifted the function of the building from scien-
tific laboratory to 'spiritual' laboratory.a5 On most other campuses, the
strategy of involving the rectorate on the committee for the mosque estab-
lishment was very effective. This approach was effective because it gave
the impression that it had no political agenda.
It is worlh noting that intellectuals who had been trained by DDII in the
PHI played a decisive role in the establishment and development of many
early campus lrosques, as most of thern became iecturers in the secular
universities where they originated. In short, the presence of mosques in-
side secular universities was a monument to the ascendancy of the dak-
wai-oriented intellectuals.
Early leaders of these mosque movements were largely drawn from
the dakwah-oriented HMI/PII46 circles of the fourth generation. Their ini-
tial audiences were Islamic activists of the fifth generation of intelligentsia,
especially those who entered university in the 1970s. In the gestation peri-
od, the principal proponents of this movement were composed largely of
the HMI/PII members as well. Although the leftist student groups had
been dismantled, activists of Islamic student organizations of the 1970s
were still motivated by a fierce competitive political struggle with tl-rose of
secular student fronts, especially to control intra-university student gov-
ernments. In the face of this challenge, these Islamic activists shared the
vision of tlre older generation of the dakwah activists to make the campus
mosque the base of student activities, both to prepare and enlarge Islamic
cadres and constituencies and to find ways of bridging the differences
Studia Islamika, Vo|. 12, No. 3,2005
The Rupturc of Young Muslim Intelligentsia 393
between student activists ofdifferent organizational backgrounds. For the
older generation, however, there was another additional interest: to protect
students of secular universities from the influence of the renewal move-
ment.aT
The prototype of this mosque movement emerged in ITB's Salman
Mosque in eariy 1970s, which adopted the ideology and 'movement intel-
lectual'48 of the so-called Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, Dakwah Fighf
er Training). LMD was first introduced by Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his
fellowsae to the community of Salman Mosque in l9l3.Interestingly, the
basic material of LMD's ideology was in fact a modified version of the
Madjid-composed NDP (of the HMI) with a stronger emphasis on the
tauhid doctrine and a special caution about the threat ofthe so-called intel-
lectual warfare (ghazwul fikr) with Western-influenced secular ideas.5o
Inspiration for the emphasis on the tauhid and ghazwul fikr was taken
from the doctrine of the well-known Egyptian Islamic movement, Ikh-
wanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood, est. 1928).
The exposure of the Islamist group to aspects of the Brotherhood ide-
ology and dakwah methods was made possible especialiy by the involve-
ment of Abdulrahim in international networks of Islamic students. One of
the most important was the Intemational Islamic Federation of Student
Organizations (IIFSO, est. 1969). With Natsir's encouragement, Abdulra-
him began to be actively involved in this organization in 1971 and soon
assumed tire position of Vice-Secretary General.5r Many leaders of this
organization had been influenced by the Brotherhood ideology. Abdulra-
him's encounter with them seemed to provide a catalyst for his rudimen-
tary understanding of the Brotherhood ideology and methods, which had a
certain influence on the curriculum and method of LMD.52
What made LMD special and influential was its training approach. Par-
ticipants had to stay in the Salman Mosque complex for about a week with
no contact with the outside world. The training began an hour before early
morning prayer (about 4.00 a.rn.), and during the day participants were
involved in intense and stirnulating small-group religious discussions. At
night they had to perform the midnight (optional) prayer, and on the final
night they had to swear an oath before the trainers containing the profes-
sion of the Faith (kalimat syahadat), 'There is no god but God, and Mu-
hammad is the Prophet of God.'53
This type of Islamic training in fact stirnulated a new religious aware-
ness that could be described as somewhat radical. The birth of this new
religious-mindedness was signaled by the wearing of jilbab (headscarf) by
female activists, wl,ich speedily became the very symbol of the mosque
(dakwah) movement. In later developments, LMD became the recruiting
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ground for junior mentors who led Islamic tutorials known as 'mentoring,
(using the English term) for other ITB students. As the mentoring activity
attracted students from other universities and even high school students in
Bandung, the Salman Mosque accommodated this enthusiasm through the
establishment of the Salman Islamic Youth Community (KARISMA).
The mentoring activities, in which participants were organized into
small discussion groups, became the basis for the creation of circles of
cohesive groups, termed usrah (Ar. family). Each usrah cell had its own
mentor who served as a motivator and role model, as well as a bridge to
connect the small groups into the whole entity of the mosque movement.
Members of usrah, in turn, became new propagandists who actively re-
cruited new followers.
LMD soon attracted Islamic activists from other secular universities.
Thus, its parlicipants were extended to include students of diverse univer-
sities throughout Indonesia.5a After attending LMD, representatives from
each campus began to introduce the dakwah training and mentoring pro-
gram on their own campuses by adapting the materiai and approach of the
Salman Mosque. In this way they laid the foundation for the establishment
of the campus mosque dakwah body that came to be known as Lembaga
Dakwah Kampus (LDK). Furthermore, former participants of the LMD
also provided connection chains for informal networks of dakwah activ-
ists across universities and for the dissemination of the Islamist ideology.
This informal network facilitated resource mobilization such as the coor-
dination of a common action plan, the exchange of information and the
provision of religious preachers or instructors for particular religious
events. Tlre sirnultaneous action of the campus dakwah bodies rapidly
extended the sphere of influence of the Islamist ideas.
The success of the LMD programs propelled the mosque movement
outside the campus. The rise of the mosque movement outside the cam-
pus itself actually coincided with the 'Islamic turn' in the secular universi-
ties. The 1970s was the formative period the emergence of the so-called
remaja masjid (the mosque youth) movement throughout Indonesia with
many activists of the HMI/PII background being involved in its gestation
period. In a sign of growing frustration with politics, the mosque youth
began to popularize the slogan 'Back to the Mosque' (using the English
phrase). Among the major mosques in large cities which were well-known
for their remaja masjidmovement activities were Al-Azhar, Sunda Kelapa,
and Cut Meutiah mosques in Jakarla, the Istiqornah and Mujahidin mosques
in Bandung, Syuhada mosque in Yogyakarta, and Al-Falah mosque in Sura-
baya.55 In recruiting members and enlarging tl,eir constituency, these groups
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benefited from the material, method of training and mentoring programs
of the campus mosque movement.
As the mosque youth movement grew in numbers, the Communication
Forum of the Indonesian Mosque Youth (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masj id
Indonesia, BKPMI) was establishedinl9TT to improve networking among
them. Structurally, the BKPMI operated as an autonomous institution in
the Indonesian Council of Mosques, while the latter was part of the World
Council of Mosques (an affiliate of the Muslim World League) with Mo-
hammad Natsir being one of its members. The BKPMI, which transformed
itself into BKPRMI56 aft.er 1993, became the catalyst for the dissemination
of Islamist ideas beyond the campus.sT
By the end of the 1970s the scope and force of this mosque movement
began to enter a new stage in the wake of the New Order's increasing
political repression. By the end ofthe 1970s student politics had reached a
low point. Following the dissolution of dewan mahasiswa (the student
council) and the irnposition of 'Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus' (NKK,
the 'normalization of campus life) in 1978, student politics gradually lost
its political significance. By the early 1980s, the ability of both extra-cam-
pus student organizations and the remaining intra-campus student govern-
ing bodies (faculty-based student senates) as mediums for the actualiza-
tion of students' political aspirations had been severely impaired. HMI, for
instance, began to lose its attraction for Islamic students.
In the face of the NKK-policy to isolate campuses from the influence
of external socio-political organizations, HMI lost its firm foothold inside
universities. It also increasingly lost its credibility in the eyes of the cam-
pus-based Islarnic activists because of its increasing cooperation with the
state and political structures. HMI officially changed its organizational prin-
ciple frorn Islam to Pancasila at the sixteenth HMI National Congress in
Padang (24-31March 1986). This change caused the organization to split
into two camps, as those who refused to accept Pancasila as the sole
principle of the organization seceded from the HMI and established a new
rival organization that came to be known as the HMI-MPO (Majelis Per-
timbangan Organis asi, Or ganizational Cons ideration Counc il). After this,
the leadership of HMI tended to follow an accommodationist line.
With the de-politicization of the student world, student activity inside
campuses was channeled into intra-student organizations which catered
for students' demands for recreation and professional development. Some
student groups, however, did manage to vent their criticism through the
mosque movement and through the creation of general discussion groups
that began to mushroom in the early 1980s.
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The campus mosque movement and the general discussion groups dis-
played antithetical tendencies. while the former operated inside the univer-
sity, the latter operated beyond the walls of the university. The former
airned to recruit a larger constituency and this was made easier by its
operation inside the campus. The discussion groups never attempted to
recruit a large membership and tended to be alienated from day to day
student life due to their operation outside the campus. while the resistance
ideology of the mosque movement derived fi.om Islamist ideologies, that
of the discussion groups in general was highly influenced by leftist and
new-leftist ideologies. whereas the mosque movement connected itself
with local and global networks of Islamic harakah (movements), the dis-
cussion groups were mostly connected with local and global networks of
socialist-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
In a furlher development, the mosque movement became more suc-
cessful than the general discussion groups and NGo movement, in being
able to maintain its 'cornmunicative sphere' as a necessary condition for
continuing and enlarging the intellectual community. operating within the
mosque, the former had a sort of cover to protect itself from direct con-
trol by the security apparatus, while the latter had no such cover and
hence were more easily controlled or eliminated by the government. In
this regards, Taufik Abdullah comments, 'It is clear that religious dis-
course, with reference to the sacred texts, is one of the few channels
relatively free from the irnposition of the mastery of meaning by the pow-
ers that be.'58
Besides being an unintended consequence of the New order's policy
of poiitical repression, the mosque movement benefited indirectly from
the modernization project. In deviating from the general theory of mod-
ernization, which tends to assume that as modernization increases, reli-
gious faith and observance declines, the New order's modernization project
brought about a new religious awareness amongst many modernized sec-
ular university students.
one of the possible reasons for the growing religious awareness had
something to do with the socio-psychological deprivation of newly urban-
ized students. Moving from the countryside or small towns into metropol-
itan cities for the sake of learning, these new student migrants were plunged
into a sort of silent atomized individualism and experienced serious prob-
lems of dislocation. As R. W. Bulliet argued:
village life changes over time, but usually change is slow enough to leave
undisturbed, at least in later memory, the illusion of stability and iontinuity.
Migration to the city, however, is a profoundly disrupting experience. Even when
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there are previous migrants from the same village to cushion one's entry into urban
life, the loss ofroutines ofthe agricultural cycle, and ofthe village's closed society,
is not easily compensated for.5e
For students from the middle and upper classes, who had long stayed
in metropolitan cities, a feeling of spiritual deprivation seemed to be a
major drive for their turn to the mosque movement. One of the results of
the New Order's modernization project, for those with money' was a
hedonistic life-style and exhibitionism among the new rich, as well as cor-
ruption among state officials and government servants. Some idealist stu-
dents ofthese classes experienced a soft of'cognitive dissonance', as a
result of disjuncture between their conception of the good life and the real
life of their family. Some of them attempted to find a spiritual sanctuary,
as an escape from the 'dirty' world.
These problems of social and spiritual deprivation became more acute
because of the presence of heterogeneous post-modern (global) cultures
brought in by the New Order's technological successes. This was sig-
naled by the emergence of a range of means of mass communication and
a bewildering experience of the proliferation of life-worlds, consumer lif-
estyles and the secularization of culture. Trapped in this situation, urban
settlers 'needed new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense
of meaning and purpose.'60 To meet this need for moral precepts, the
urban educated-Muslims faced a dilemma. should they embrace material-
istic and secularist modern values in order to feel fully part of the new
world (thereby spurning their traditions), or should they, on the contrary,
revive their local traditions, even at the price of material disadvantage. It
was painful to spurn indigenous traditions, but it was also painful to re-
main under-developed. Many Muslims attempted to solve this dilernrna by
embracing neither modern Western values nor local indigenous tradition,
but rather returning to what they perceived as their true origin; that is the
Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. In extreme cases'
this obsession with returning to Islamic authenticity led to the emergence
of Islamic fundamentalism.6r
Having been poorly educated in religious matters, new migrant and
urban students who crowded into secular universities in metropolitan cit-
ies from the latter part of the 1970s constituted what Bulliet called the
'new edge' of the Muslim community. In the relative absence of corpo-
rate life (civil society) 
- 
in the European sense 
- 
in Indonesia, the need
of these 'new edge' Muslims for a new community and moral precepts
was met particularly by the presence of the network of mosque move-
ments, Sufr.orders and other Muslim institutions. In their encounter with
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the Islamic epistemic community, these 'new edge' Muslims began to
question their existence as Muslims. At the same time, secular policies that
had created the public education system diminished the status of tradition-
ally trained ulama. Thus, when the new edge began to ask questions about
Islam, they did not turn automatically to the traditional kyai from whom
their parents would have sought advice. They turned rather to 'non-scho-
lastic' asseftive Muslirn thinkers who, in many cases, had not received an
established traditional religious education. As Bulliet noted: 'The fact that
the answers these thinkers gave to the questions asked of them were often
at odds with traditional teachings, or manifestly predicated upon ideas
deriving from Wbstern academic study, did not deter the young men and
women of the new edge from following them.'62
The religious curiosity of this 'new edge' was also fed by the flourish-
ing of new Islamic publications. Beginning in early 1980s, the fifth gener-
ation of Muslim activists established new Islamic publishing houses, such
as Pustaka-Salnan and Mizan in Bandung, Gema Insani Press in Jakafta,
and Shalahuddin Press in Yogyakarta, which provided alternative Islamic
reading for the new edge. TlTis reading material was initially derived from
the translated works of foreign Islamic thinkers and then from anthologies
of articles by Indonesian intellectuals. Throughout the 1980s there also
emerged new Islamic journals and magazines such as Risalah, Amanah,
Pesantren, Salman Kau and UIumuI Qur'an. The emergence of this num-
ber of Islamic publications reflected and affected the Islamic enthusiasm
of the new edge. This contributed to making Islamic publications the trend
setters in book production in the 1980s. Based on a survey of the 'Library
and Documentation Section' of Tenpo magazine, of the 1 ,241 total books
collected by this section between 1980-1987, the number of books on
religious themes was 1,949 
- 
most of which were on Islamic themes.63
The Islamic zeal of this new edge found its actualizing space in the
campus mosque. In this context, the mosque served as the melting pot for
the new edge of different Islamic streams. Having no direct connection to
any major organized Islam, the campus mosque was able to distance itself
from historical Islamic disputes on matters of different interpretation. Slowly
but surely, activists of the mosque movement began to form a new Islam-
ic hybrid which disengaged itself from the long-established divide between
traditionalist versus reformist Islamic groups. At the same time the Islam-
ic teaching of the campus mosque seemed to suit the religious disposition
of new urbanized students. There was a strong indication that urbaniza-
tion had been followed by the shift in the religious disposition and affilia-
tion of many students, from the characteristics of rural Islam that tends to
stress 'anthropolatry' towards the characteristics of the urban middle-
class Islam that tends to stress 'bibliolatry'.64
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Another aspect of modernization that helped boost the reputation of the
mosque movement was the growing number of Muslim intellectuals with
Masters and PhD degrees. Benefiting from the government's drive for
human resource development through overseas training, many dakwah-
oriented scholars were able to improve their educational qualifications in
Western countries, the very countries that were often viewed by Islamists
with a double-consciousness. On the one hand, these Western countries
were often portrayed as a source of moral degeneration and as a menacing
threat to Islarnic civilization. On the other hand, they were commonly
viewed as a source of admiration since those who were able to study in
the Western world were highly respected by their fellow compatriots. A
significant number of Islamic scholars from secular university backgrounds
began to pursue PhD or Masters degrees in Western universities in the
1970s. Arnong them were such prominent dakwahactivists as Amien Rais,
Imaduddin Abdulrahirn, Syaf i Ma'arif, Kuntowidjojo, Fuad Amsjari, and
Djalaluddin Rahrnat (all who went to the USA), Endang Saifuddin Anshari
(who went to Canada), and A. M. Saefuddin (who went to Germany).
When they returned hotne, rnostly in early 1980s, they contributed to the
strengthening of the intellectual credibility of the mosque movement.
In addition to the unintended consequences ofpolitical repression and
modernization, another driving force for the development of the mosque
movement was the reconnection of the Indonesian Islamic movement to
that of global Islam. Since the late I920s, much of the attention and ener-
gy of the Indonesian Muslim community had been focused on domestic
political struggles and intra-religious tensions that caused the Indonesian
Islamic movernent to be inward looking. The New Order obstruction of
political Islam, which coalesced with the drive of rnodernization, provided
the irnpetus for the younger generation of Muslim intelligentsia to recon-
nect itself with the global ummat.In this way the new Islamic movement
tended to be more outward looking.
This reconnection with the global ummat took place at the very time
when the entire Muslim World was swept by the growing tide of Islarnism
as the new ideological passion. Beginning in the 1970s, the failure of the
secular elite and their secular ideologies to offer an effective redemption
for the socio-economic plight of Muslim societies in previous decades
gave rise to a general social dissatisfaction. This disappointment, in the
context of the Arab world, culminated in the defeat of Arab countries in
the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Henceforlh, the efficacy of secular ideologies
such as socialism, liberalism, and Arabism were seriously questioned, and
many Islarnic activists began to call upon the Muslim community to return
to the authentic source (ashala) of Islamic values. In countries character-
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ized by moderate-secularism like Egypt, for instance, the literature of
Marxism, existentialism, and other Westem theories that were widely cir-
culated among student activists in the 1950s and 1960s now began to be
replaced by the Islamists' works, especially those of Muslim Brotherhood
figures, such as Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna. Groups of Islamic fun-
damentalist intelligentsia such as the Jama'at Islamiyya in Egypt began to
attract large numbers of recruits from amongst universify students in the
Arab World and beyond. Even in a secular Muslim country such as Tur-
key, the term 'aydin'(Islamist intellectual) became popular in the 1980s.
This tide of Islamism gained its material foundation from the boom in oil
prices in the 1970s giving rise to 'Petro-Islam'. The trickle-down effect
of this oil boom brought benefits for the dissemination of Islamism, as
giants of Petro-Islam like Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance to the
dakwahorganizations, especially through the Muslim World League.65
Being receptive to external influences, the mosque movement in Indo-
nesia became interested in Islamic ideas and methods of contemporary
Islamic movements (harakah) in the Muslim World. In1969, one of Sayy-
id Qutb's works, This Religion of Islam (published in 1967), was translat-
ed into Indonesian under the title Inilah Islamby A.R. Baswedan and A.
Hanafi and published by Hudaya (Jakarta). In 1978 another translated work
of Qutb, Masyarakat Islam (Islamic Society), was published in Bandung.66
Thus, in the 1970s, Islamic ideas of this venerable intellectual of the Egypt-
born Islamic harakahthe Muslim Brotherhood became accessible to a par-
ticular segrnent of the Indonesian Islamic scholarly community. This would
be followed in subsequent decades by the arrival of the Malaysian move-
ment Darul Arqam, the Indo-Pakistan-originated Jama'ah Tabligh, the Jor-
dan-originated Hizbut Tahrir, amongst others.67
DDII was the agent most responsible for the dissemination of the Brother-
hood's ideolory and dakwah method. Natsir had a close relationship with
leaders ofthe Brotherhood. The banning of Masjumi made him sympathetic to
the Brotherhood that had faced similar persecution in Egypt.68 Moreover, the
Brotherhood's emphasis on the so-called tarbiyah movement (social-educa-
tion based on a tight network of usrah), was regarded by DDII as a useful
method for the dakwah movement in Indonesia. In 1980, DDII's magazine
and publishing house, MediaDakwah, published atranslation of Sayyid Qutb's
work, Ma'alim fi al-Tharsq under the title Petunjuk Jalan(Signposts along the
Road).@ Moreover, in 1980 Natsir and DDII began to support the establish-
ment of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islarn dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for
Islamic and Arabic Studies). This institution was founded by King AbduI Aziz
bin Abdullah of Saudi Arabia underthe guidance of Mohammad Qutb (brother
of Salyid Qutb) and well-known Islarnic scholar Shaikh Abdul' Aziz bin B az.
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They advised Abdullah to contact Natsir to ask for his supporl. It was due to
this strong connection with Brotherhood figures that led to LIPIA's library
being loaded with Brotherhood literature.To
Meanwhile, by the early 1980s some students who had been sent by
Natsir to undeftake overseas studies in the Middle East had retuned home.
Among them were people like Abu RidhoTl who had studied in Saudi Ara-
bia and had been influenced by the teachings and methods of the Brother-
hood harakah. When he returned home in 198 I he began to promote Broth-
erhood ideologies and methods of dakwahamong the DDII activists. Thus,
there emerged an early circle of Brotherhood followers within DDII, com-
posed of Abu Ridho and some younger activists such as Mashadi (person-
al secretary of Mohamad Roem) and Mukhlish Abdi.?'z
Brotherhood ideas then spread to activists of PII. Besides the long
history of a close relationship between PII with Masjumi/DDII activists,
the PII central office was located in the same complex as the DDII office.
Duringthe period ofMutarnmimul Ula's leadership (1983-86), Qutb's trans-
lated works, particularly Petunjuk lalan, were used in PII training.T3 The
same book became compulsory reading material for alumni of Salman's
LMD.74 Following the PII's rejection of Pancasila as the sole basis of the
socio-political organization, the PII was banned from the public sphere
which hindered the marketing of Brotherhood ideology in this organiza-
tion. Nevertheless. Islamic ideas and dakwahmethods of the Brotherhood
continued to influence the Indonesian dakwah movement. Other works of
Brotherhood leaders were translated by graduates of Middle East universi-
ties. Abu Ridho played a conspicuous role in this project by translating
works of Hasan Al Banna, Mushtafa Masyhur and Sa'id Hawwa, and es-
tablishing his own publishing house, Al-IshlahyPress to print them.75 New
Islamic publishers such as Gema Insani Press, Al-Kautsar, Robbani Press
and Era Intermedia enhanced the success of Brotherhood popularization
by translating and publishing other works of Qutb as well as works of
Brotherhood figures such as Muhammad Qutb, Muhammad Al Ghazali
and Yusuf Qardhawi. As a result, Brotherhood ideologies and dakwah
methods greatly influenced Islamic activists of the campus mosques and
were soon adopted by the training and mentoring program of LDK.
The reconnection of the Indonesian Muslirn community to global Islam
was also signified by the increase in numbers of Indonesian students in the
Middle East. According to Mona Abaza's recordsT6, in 1966 the total mem-
bership of the Indonesian student association in Egypt was 36; in 19821
1983 the number of Indonesian students in this country jumped to 415,
increasing to 722-730 in 1987, and reaching around 1000 in 1993. In
1987, the total number of Indonesian students studying in Arab and Per-
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sian countries was 1742 with most of them being in Saudi Arabia (904
students) and Egypt (722 students). The rest of the students were in Iran
(32),Libya(27),Syria (21), Sudan (10), Jordan (9),Iraq (8), Turkey (7),
and Algeria (2) respectively. Unlike Indonesian students in Western coun-
tries, however, most Indonesian students who studied in Muslim coun-
tries were studying at the undergraduate level. Influenced by the growing
popularity of Islarnic harakah in the Middle East, many of these students
after their return home became, strategic paftners of the mosque activists
in championing harakah ideologies.
Another major event in the Muslim World that influenced the develop-
ment of the mosque movement in Indonesia was the Iranian Revolution of
1979. Although the majority of Iranians follow Shiite Islam, while Indone-
sians follow Sunni Islam, this did not discourage Indonesian Islamic activ-
ists from admiring the success of the Islamic revolution and even led a
few circles of Indonesian Muslims, especially those of Arabic origin, to be
attracted to Shi'ahteachings.TT For most Indonesian Islamic activists, how-
ever, this did not lead to (internal) religious conversion. For them, the
significance of the Iranian Islamic revolution simply lay in its ability to
provide an Islamic concept of revolution.
Soon after the Iranian Islamic revolution, new Islamic publishing houses,
especially the Bandung-based Mizan publisher, published translations of
the works of Iranian intellectual-revolutionaries such as Ali Shariati, Mur-
tadla Muthahhari and Imam Khomeini. These works provided Indonesian
Islamic activists with additional inspiration and motivation for Indonesian
Islamic Movements. Thus, Ali Shariati's term' raushan.frkr' (enlightened
thought),78 which advocated intellectual engagement with the plight of
human beings, appealed to activists of the mosque movement.
Tire tide of Islamism which coincided with the windfall of the oil boom
had given rise to a climate of optimism in the entire Muslirn World that
envisaged the arrival of an Islamic renaissance. The 'World of Islam Fes-
tival' in London in August 1976, whicl-r exhibited the glorious past of Is-
lam, expressed the spirit of Islamic revivalism. In the lead-up to the 1980s,
the Muslim World League began to proclaim the 15th century of the Mus-
lim calendar (hijriyah-which started in 1 98 1) as the era of Islamic resur-
gence. To mark this imagined historic moment, the Muslim World League
conducted the very first Islarnic Mass Media Conference which took place
in Jakarta, the capital of the most populous Muslim country, 1-3 Septem-
ber 1980. The reverberations from this event further galvanizedthe Islarn-
ic zeal of the mosque movement in Indonesia.
The campus mosques continued to serve as the exemplary centers of
the mosque movement. Slowly but surely, almost every secular university
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developed its own LDK, and every LDK formed collaborations with lec-
turers of Islamic subjects to make sure that the 'mentoring' program be-
came paft of the curriculum. Slowly but surely, the original content and
method of dakwah as offered by LMD was overshadowed by that which
was imported from the international harakah. The dakwah movements
increasingly drew on Arabic terminologies and replaced the English that
had been widely adopted by Islamic student movements in the previous
decades. By the late 1980s, the mosque movement under the influence of
the Muslim Brotherhood began to be known as the tarbiyah (educational)
movement, using the same code as the Brotherhood.
The dakwah activists of the late 1980s and the 1990s were more ded-
icated than the HMl/Pll-dominated dakwah activists of the 1960s11910s
in their appreciation of mosque life. According to a well-known campus
mosque activist of the 1990s, Fahri Hamzah, the mosque was not the main
ground for the HMI/PII training and activities, and it was not until the late
1960s that the dakwah-oriented HMI/PII intellectuals began to turn to the
mosque as their base. For the later dakwah activists, on the other hand,
the mosque was not only the main ground for their training and activities
from the very beginning but also, for many of them, the home at which
they stayed. This intimacy with mosque life caused the internalization of
an Islamic identity and Islamic mindedness of the later dakwah activists to
be much deeper than that of the dakwah-oriented HMI intellectuals.Te As
such, the later dakwah actividts were more susceptible to the influence of
more puritan/rnilitant Islamic ideas offered by the international Islamic
harakah.
Moreover, there were at least two other reasons for the deepening
identification of the Indonesian dakwah activists with the international fia-
rakah. Muslims in the 'edge' (new learners of Islam on the periphery of
the Muslim World) tended to glorify the 'center' either as a reflection of
their obsession with authenticity or as an over-compensation for their lack
of authority in Islamic studies. For people with this kind of psychological
predisposition, the Islamic ideas of the international harakahoffered a sense
ofcredibility and authenticity, since organic intellectuals ofthis harakah
mostly came from the centre of the Muslim World 
- 
that is the Middle East 
-or at least from those who had studied in the Middle East. At the same
time, there was a serious shortage of in-depth Islamic literature written by
Indonesian intellectuals.
In tlre deepening identification with the international harakah, the later
dakwah activists formed a distinct response to the challenges of the mod-
ern world. As the majority of Indonesian Muslims had been intensely ex-
posed to the process of modernization, and most of the campus dakwah
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activists had also been very familiar with modern science and technology,
the later dakwah activists began to depart from the historical project of
previous generations of Muslim intelligentsia. while the concern of previ-
ous generations was how to modemize Islam, the concern of the later
dakwahperiod was how to Islamize modernity. consequently, people like
Imaduddin Abdulrahim and other dakwahactivists of the 1960s and 1970s,
who used to be viewed as too Islamist by the standards of that time, came
to be regarded as too moderate by the standards of dakwahactivists of the
late 1980s and the 1990s. For instance, Abdulrahim did not insist that his
wife wear the jilbab (veil), which came to be considered obligatory for a
true Islamic believer, as well as an icon for the Islamization of modernity.
Slogans such as 'Islam is the solution' and 'Islam is the alternative, now
reverberated throughout university campuses.
To consolidate groups of LDK and to strengthen the cooperation.mong
them, LDK activists from diverse campus backgrounds organized the first
inter-LDK meeting known as Forum silaturahmi(Fs)-LDK in ITB's Sal-
man Mosque in 1986. At the second inter-LDK meeting, held in the IpB's
Al-Ghifari mosque in 1987, the guiding principle (khitah) of the LDK was
formulated: 'the LDK struggle rests on Islam as the religion of Allah (dinul-
lah) and as a way of life, and will be united through the tie of the profes-
sion of the faith 1'There is no god but God; Muhammad is the prophet of
God';.ao This informal forum formed a network that connected theie dak-
wai activists to one another, thus empowering their collective identity and
solidarity. The forum also provided avenues for exchanging ideas, allocat-
ing resources, and strengthening networks.
The FS-LDK, with its ideology and networks, served as the basis for
further socio-political action. when the political opportunity structure in
the New order's public sphere changed in the late 1990s, dakwah activ-
ists of the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, composed largely of
those who were bom in the 1970s, began to translate the LDK network
into a political action group. In the midst of the 'reformasl , (reform) move-
ment of 1998, the tenth inter-LDK meeting, which was attended by 64 out
of the 69 existing LDKs throughout Indonesia and held in the mosque of
the Muhammadiyah University in Malang on25-29 March 1998, agreed to
transform the LDK network into Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indo-
nesra (KAMMI, the united Front of Indonesian Islamic university Stu-
dents) with Fahri Hamzah of uI as its first chairman. The acronym ,KA-
MMI' was inspired by 'KAMI', the HMl-dominated student movement of
1966.rn the newly established KAMMI, however, HMi was not included
and its role in the reform movement was also marginal. KAMMI was to
become the most powerful student front in the 199g student movement
and beyond.8'
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The Development of the Renewal Movement
As the secular universities became the stronghold of the dakwahmove-
ment, religious institutions (especially IAINs) became the strongholds of
the renewal movement. There are several explanations for this phenome-
non. In Islamic institutions, almost all students are members of the santri
(devout Muslim) community. As such, the level of competitive ideo-polit-
ical struggle among students in Islamic institutions was less intense than
that in the secular universities. The perennial conflict within the IAIN is an
endogenous one, between the traditionalist and reformist-oriented Islamic
students. Because of the lack of competition with supporters of secular
ideologies inside the calnpus, students at Islamic institutions by and large
tend to be less motivated than Islamic activists in secular universities in
their propagation of Islamic claims.
In addition, Nurcholish Madjid had a hypothesis that the lack of reli-
gious instruction in secular universities prompted Islamic activists there to
be more appreciative of Islamic knowledge and symbols. Needless to say,
this lack ofreligious teaching could also lead students in secular universi-
ties to secular-mindedness.s2 Following the same logic it could be argued
that the relative lack of secular scientific instruction in IAINs and pesant-
rens could lead students of this community to highly value secular knowl-
edge and symbols. Again, it could also be argued that overwhelming amounts
of religious instruction could also lead students in Islamic institutions to
Islamic conservatism.
Imaduddin Abdulrahim believed that the persisting residue of colonial
hierarchies of knowledge made students in Islamic institutions feel inferior
to students in secular universities. To overcome this sense of inferiority,
he believed, students in Islamic institutions tended to over-compensate by
showing off their erudition in and openness to Western intellectual ideas.83
Pursuing this reasoning, we may assume that Islamic activists in secular
universities tend to be obsessed with Arabic terminologies and Islamist
ideas as an over-compensation for their poor mastery of Arabic and Is-
lamic literature.
Moreover, for many IAIN students, Madjid was regarded as a hero.
His double term as chairman of HMI and his reputation as the most cele-
brated Muslim intellectual of his generation helped raise the self-confi-
dence and intellectual leverage of the IAIN community. In this way, he
served as a role model for many of the IAIN students and intellectuals and
his renewal ideas provided a benchmark for a new generation of IAIN
intellectuals. His period of study at the University of Chicago,sa for his
doctorate (1978-1984), provided the inspiration for many IAIN scholars
to study at Western centers of Islamic studies.
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The receptiveness of a great bulk of the IAIN community to the re-
newal movement was reinfoiced by the pro-modernization and accommo-
dation policy of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since the Mukti Ali
period (1973-1978), this Ministry began to strengthen the teaching of gen-
eral subjects in the IAIN and to encourage Muslim scholars to obtain high-
er education at Western centers of study. Apart from the government's
general admiration for Western scientific and technological achievements,
this encouragement was intended to stimulate Muslim intellectuals to take
a more 'objective' view of religion's role and to appreciate the need to
accommodate it to a secularized modem world. In doing this, as Ruth
McVey noted, the Ministry of Religious Affairs had 'tried to bridge the gap
between the sanfricommunity and the state by providing Islam with spokes-
men who can communicate easily with the regime and share its general
perceptions.'85
The immediate impact of this govemment support was a shift in the
main destination for overseas postgraduate study of IAIN scholars 
-from centers of Islamic studies in the Middle East to those in the Western
World. Until the late 1960s, only a few Indonesian scholars with Islarnic
educational backgrounds pursued Islamic studies at Western universities.
Among the very few were H. M. Rasjidi, Mukti Ali, Anton Timur Jaelani,
Harun Nasution, and Kafrawi.86 From the 1970s onwards, however, the
flow of IAIN scholars to Western universities multiplied and continued to
increase exponentially. It was returnees from Western universities who
became the potential agents for the diffusion of renewal ideas among the
IAIN community (and beyond) throughout Indonesia.
Renewal ideas also found fertile ground in HMI. With the HMI being
dorninated by pragmatic and moderate intellectuals, renewal ideas provid-
ed the mainstream HMi members with an ideological legitimacy for their
integration into the New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the period
of Ridwan Saidi's chairmanship (1974-76), it was thought that the HMI
would provide an institutional basis for renewal ideas. Madjid and his col-
leagues, however, did not suppofi the implementation of this idea, on the
grounds that formalization might lead to the stagnation of renewal con-
cepts.8i Even so, HMI members continued to become a potential audience
for renewal ideas.
Beyond the IAIN and HMI community, the renewal ideas appealed to
the accommodationist Muslim politicians and bureaucrats. The latter were
mainly those who typically had no strong interest in theoretical Islamic
thinking but provided the practical mechanism for the grounding of re-
newal ideas within the New Order political structure. Representatives of
these politicians and bnreaucrats were Akbar Tandjung (Chairman of HMI,
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1971-73) and Mar'ie Muhammad (a prominent HMI activist). Behind these
two, there was a block of pragmatic Muslim intelligentsia who aspired to
political and bureaucratic positions but could not achieve them through the
vehicle of political Islam. Their incorporation into the New Order bureau-
cracy strengthened the Muslim 'bloc within' that had been pioneered by
the previous generation of Muslim intelligentsia.
For the Muslim intelligentsia of the bloc within, Madjid's slogan, 'Is-
lam, yes; Islamic par1y, no!' and the acceptance of the Pancasila by major
Islamic organizations after 1983 were particularly pertinent. These were
viewed as an indication of acceptance ofthe state orthodoxy and paved
the road for a mutual rapprochement between the Muslim intelligentsia
and the state as well as making the state more responsive towards Mus-
lims' cultural and positional interests.
The effect of the renewal ideas of former HMI leaders reverberated
throughout society following in the path of the development of the renew-
al movement within the biggest traditionalist Islamic association, Nahdlat-
ul Ulama (NU). The main protagonist of the renewal movement within this
traditionalist community was Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), NU's fore-
most intellectual and member of the most honored farnily-line in that com-
munity. He was a grandson of the venerable founding father of the NU,
Hasj im Asj ' ari, and also a son of a prominent NU scholar, Wachid Hasj im.
After eight years' study in the Middle East (first at Al-Azhar Universi-
ty, Egypt and then at Baghdad University, Iraq), Abdurrahman Wahid re-
turned to Jombang (East Java), the stronghold of the Indonesian tradition-
alist community, in 1971. When he returned home having studied both
Islamic and Western literature, he was soon confronted with two serious
challenges within the NU community: the challenge of the government-
promoted modemization and the beginning of NU's strained relationship
with the government that resulted from NU's considerable success in the
197 I election. How to enable the traditionalist community to come to terms
with modemization and the (state-defined) national interest soon became
his main concern.
As an intellectual, Wahid was challenged to develop a reinterpretation
of the NU traditionalist legal and theological thinking in order to better deal
with the challenge of modernization and national interests, while at the
same time remaining respectful of indigenous local traditions. This was
reflected in his early works such as Bunga Rampai Pesantren (Capita Se-
lecta of the Pesantren, 1979) and Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan (Mus-
lims in the Midst of Struggle, 1 9B 1).
His renewal ideas following neo-traditionalist lines were enriched by
his socialization with intellectuals of diverse backgrounds, especially the
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Jakarta-based renewal intellectuals. From the 1970s he was invited by
Tawang Alun, Dawam Rahardjo and Adi Sasono (pro-renewal HMI intel-
lectuals in the NGO sector) to take part in a project concerning pesantren
community development, designed by two prominent Jakarta based-NGOs,
the Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information Institute
(LP3ES, est. 1971) and the Association for Pesantren and Community
Development (P3M, est. 1983). Through his encounter with NGO activ-
ists, Wahid's intellectual ideas began to be imbued with the dominant themes
among NGO activists: alternative development, democracy and human
rights.88
Wahid was also invited to join a circle of renewal intellectuals of neo-
modernism gathered around an NGO organization, LKIS, and around a
pluralistic discussion forum known as Majelis Reboan (The Wednesday
Circle, est. 1984).8e Both of these institutions contributed to the reinforce-
ment of Wahid's ideas on secularization, pluralism, non-sectarianism, in-
clusivism, and the contextualization of Islam.eo This would lead to the
formulation of his Islamic paradigm called 'pribumisasi Islam'(indigeni-
zation of Islam). Through this paradigm, the traditionalist community found
not only a new intellectual weapon to defend its historical religious prac-
tices from reformist-modernist criticism, but also a new rationale for the
subordination oflslam to the national interest.
Wahid's intellectual ideas partly reflected his genuine commitment to
pluralism, the national interest, and democracy, but they were not entirely
devoid of political interest. As a man committed to defend the interests of
the traditionalist community, he attempted to ease the strained relationship
between NU and the authorities and to bring NU along the accommoda-
tionist line. He came to see the necessity of accommodationism because
of the continuing marginalization ofNU politicians from the Islamic party,
PPP. The government's imposition of Pancasila as the sole political princi-
ple (azas tunggal) provided him with a means to draw the NU away from
the PPP and to bring it closer to the government. Already in December
1983 he had successfully influenced the NU national meeting in Situbondo
(East Java) to accept Pancasila as azas tunggal and to return the NU to its
original spirit (khitah) as a social and religious organization. Like Madjid's
slogan'Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!', this return tothe khitah is worth
considering as a political strategy which used a non-formal political ap-
proach to strengthen the NU's bargaining power with the New Order
regime. Shortly after the Tandjung Priok massacre on 72 September 1984,
Wahid made the controversial decision to invite General L. B. Murdani to
visit some NU pesantrens. Partly as a result of this friendly move towards
the government he was able to be elected as the Chairman of the NU's
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executive body (tanfidziyah) in December lg}4.In l9gg, he was also
appointed as a Golkar representative in the working committee of the
MPR.
while maintaining his accommodationist strategy, wahid was also able
to maintain the NU's reputation and his own in the eyes of the community
based on his participation in NGo activities and his outspoken champion-
ing of pluralism, democracy and human rights. In many cases, however,
not all good things went together. His position as the defender of the inter-
ests of the traditionalist community drew him towards accommodation
with the govemment, while his position as a free intellectual urged him to
speak truth to power. Because of this he became known as the most
controversial Muslim intellectual. As the chairman of the largest Muslim
organization in the country his renewal ideas made a significant contribu-
tion to the impact of the renewal movement.
The hegernony of the renewal discourse in the public sphere, which
was made possible by the positive reception of the'regimes of truth, (the
state ideological apparatus and media exposure) in a Foucauldian sense,er
would finally force Muhammadiyah to supporl the renewal ideas, although
in a more limited way. The acceptance of the renewal ideas within Mu-
hammadiyah came rather late for at least two reasons. As a reformist
organization, Muhammadiyah could not easily bury its desire to maintain
islamic purity and authenticity. Moreover, prominent young figures of
Muhammadiyah such as Amien Rais and Syaf i Ma'arif had a close rela-
tionship with DDII. Even so, the exposure of these young intellectuals to
another epistemic community and the inteliectual network had a signifi-
cant impact on their later intellectual development. This was especially
true after Rais and Maarif undertook postgraduate studies in the USA.
Both Rais and Maarif finished their phD programs at the University of
chicago in 1 98 1 and 1982 respectively. During their study at that univer-
sity, Rais was supervised by three Jewish scholars, one of them being
Leonard Binder,e2 while Maarif was supervised by, among others, a prom_
inent liberal (neo-modernist) pakistani Islamic thinker who also taught
Madjid and Fazlur Rahman. Through their encounter with these intellectu-
als who were promoting liberalism, they began to be more sympathetic to
the renewal ideas.
In November 1982 Amien Rais surprised the Indonesian public by his
move towards the reneu,al line. In an interview with panji Masyarakat
(1rlo. 37611982) he rejected the concept of the Islamic state because, ac-
cording to him, it was not mentioned inthe eur'anor the sunnafr (way of
the Prophet). Next, he stated he could accept the pancasila as the stare
ideology, on the basis that Islam is the supreme ideology and the pancasila
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itself does not contradict Islamic principles. Under the influence of young
intellectual figures such as Rais, the Muhammadiyah National Congress in
December 1985 accepted Pancasila as its azas tunggal. Many Muham-
madiyah intellectuals, however, tended to reject the idea of Secularization
on the basis that the concept is alien to Islam. The rejection of an Islamic
state, in Rais' view, was by no means meant to push for the removal of
religious values and guidance from public life. The first principle of Pan-
casila,he argued, implicitly recognizes the indivisibility of religion and public
life. This latter view made it possible for him and other Muhammadiyah
intellectuals to remain on good terms with activists of the dakwah move-
rnent. At the same time, this inhibited the furlher development of his liberal
ideas. His renewal ideas were then focused on the rethinking of Islamic
legal theories (fiqh), to enable Islam to respond better to the challenges of
modern life, and then on the practical reform of the Indonesian political
system.
The gestures of Muslirn intellectuals and organizations towards the
state orlhodoxy freed the Muslim intelligentsia in the bureaucracy from
the stigrna of being against the New Order and helped break the psycho-
logical barrier to expressing cultural Islam within bureaucratic settings.
Muslim bureaucrats now openly organized communal prayers, religious
services and the celebration of Islamic Days. They also established at first
small prayer houses (mushalla) but then gradually built rnosques (masjid)
near most government offices. Slowly but surely, Muslim bureaucrats
dared to express their Islamic identity, expressed through new fashions
like using Islamic greetings (assalamu'alaikum) and making the pilgrimage
to Mecca. A rapprochement between nominal and devout Muslims within
the bureaucracy began to take place, as the former were gradually incor-
porated into the'house' of cultural Islam. Many nominal Muslim bureau-
crats began to learn more about Islam by inviting private Islamic teachers
to their own houses with the Soeharto family being a notable example of
this phenomenon.e3
There were some surprising results from these developments as exem-
plified by the following B. J. Habibie story. Once in the late 1980s, he said,
Soeharlo led and opened the Cabinet meeting wearing a peci (black cap, as
an icon of Muslim identity) and reciting 'bismillah' (a phrase used by
Muslims for various occasions and considered an act of piety). Habibie
then asked hirn he had done this, to which Soeharto replied, 'Formerly,
we were weak economically. That is why we needed the Catholic lobby
for the international capitalist community and why it was difficult for me
to express my own Islamic identity. But now we are sufficiently strong to
assert our own identity.'e4
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Islamic Youth in the Aftermath of the Reform Movement
The resignation of Soeharto (on 2l May l99B) and Habibi's interreg-
num brought about a new political opportunity for the Muslim communi-
ty. Under the free public sphere and political fairness of the so-called 're-
form era', the Muslim intelligentsia showed their original diverse nature.
Fuelled by a mixture of ideological differences, modernization-driven po-
litical pragmatism, elite rivalries, and the sudden explosion of freedom,
Muslim groups cornpeted with each other to establish their own political
parties. As a result, Muslim politics became more fragmented than it had
ever been.
Along the path of this fragmentation, a new generation of the Muslim
inteliigentsia emerged showing the almost characteristic tendency to di-
versity. A new generation of dakwah activists, led by the fifth generation
of Muslirn intellectuals but comprised largely of those of the sixth genera-
tion (who were mostly born in the 1970s and 1980s), after exposure to the
post-modern global conditions became more deeply incorporated into the
global Islamic harakah. Nevefiheless, they were by no means homoge-
nous. Contestation and rivalries occurred between followers of different
harakah over the difference in manhaj (rnethod of reasoning), intellectual
networks, and leadership competition. The most influential Indonesian
harakah was that under the influence of the Muslim Rrotherhood, namely
KAMMI and its political party, the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS).
On the other hand, a new generation of PMII (traditionalist student
organization) activists, influenced by Abdurrahman Wahid's liberal think-
ing, experienced an unprecedented degree ofliberalization. In parallel with
this development, the renewal movement continued under the leadership
of young intellectuals from IAIN and NU backgrounds in collaboration
with young Islamic-friendly secular intellectuals from secular university
backgrounds. At tlie beginning of the 21" century, these young protago-
nists of Islamic renewal ideas began to promote the so-called network of
liberal Islarn (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL). New intellectuals of this move-
ment such as Ulil Abshar-Abdallah, Luthfi Assyaukani and Saiful Muzani
in their exposure to the post-modern global condition went deeper than
their predecessors in their appreciation of Western liberal-secular values.
Thus, the exposure of young Muslirn intelligentsia to post-modern con-
ditions and the deepening globalization at the turn of the new millennium
resulted in an antithetical tendency. One extreme gravitated towards Is-
larnic fundamentalism, while the other extreme gravitated towards West-
ern liberalism and secularism. Yet, the majority of Muslim activists contin-
ue to accept and to extend the hybridity between different cultural tradi-
tions.
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The energy of Islamic fundamentalism continued to be checked by the
energyoflslamicliberalism.Theinternalvarietiesoflndonesianlslam
providedabuilt-inmechanismforlslamicmoderation.Underthesecondi-
tions,thepossibilityoftranscendingineluctablereligio-culturaldifferenc-
es, to soften and render them tolerable to civil order' continued to be
imaginable.
Conclusion
The process of modernization inthe Muslim world' especially in Indo-
nesia, does not necessarily result in secularization' as claimed by the 
pro-
ponents of social Darwinism' It may, in fact' actually enlarge religious
p"ruuriu"n"ss.Atthesametime,thislattertendencydoesnotnecessarily
lead to Islamic fundamentalism'
FormainstreamlndonesianMuslimscholars,Islamiscompatiblewith
science and modern rationalism' One can be Muslim and modern at the
same time. The reality, however, is not always as such: not all good things
go together. Modernization and Islamization seem to have their own logic'
As a result, the relationship of both projects has not always been harmoni-
ous but rather conflicting' tf this is the case' which one should Muslim
Youthchoose:MODERNIZEDIslamoTISLAMIZE'Dmodernity?Ifthe
choiceisthefirst,theresulthasbeenmoreliberalMuslims'Ontheother
hand, if the choice is the later, the result has been more fundamentalist
Muslims. For the greatest bulk of young Muslims' however' the choice
hasnotbeen.eitheror,,butratheracocktailofvariousculturaltraditions.
'The Indonesian (and especially the Javanese) mode of attack" said
Clifford Geertzwas ;adaptive, absorbent' pragmatic' and gradualistic' a
matter of partial compromises, half-way covenants' and outright evasions'
The Islamism which resulted did not even pretend to purity' it pretended
to comPrehensiveness.'es
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